Chakiros in Halachah: Is philosophizing futile or fulfilling?
A popular derech halimud (approach to learning Torah) is in the realm of lomdishe chakiros (philosophical analysis [of Gemara and Halachah])—a deep and thorough analyzation in attempt to find the underpinnings and systemic reasoning of halachah. Is this study a way to enhance our Torah learning and therefore an element of yagdil Torah v’yaadir (making Torah great and glorifying it)? Or is the Torah learner responsible to cover more ground by studying the practical application of more halachos instead of time-consuming philosophizing?
The difference lies in the results of such careful scrutiny, so as not to engage in chakiros that are an exercise in shpalten a har (Yid., “splitting hairs”) which could be a waste of time. Often, the distinction between futile and useful analysis can be discerned by establishing whether there is a nafka minah (practical difference), actual pragmatic halachic bearing resulting from the chakiros.
Following are several examples where a lomdishe chakirah has bearing on halachah:
Pidyon Haben: An examination of the laws of pidyon haben (the redemption of the firstborn) raises the following question: Does the mitzvah stem from a halachic—and therefore Divine—obligation or is it merely a financial obligation to the kohen? If the latter is the case, a shliach (agent) of the baby’s father would be permitted to transact the redemption, but if it is a religious transaction, the father would be obligated to perform the exchange himself. The nafka minah of such investigation would result in an understanding of how pidyan haben should be fulfilled.
Chinuch: What is the nature of the mitzvah of chinuch (educating the young)? A chakirah of this parental duty would reveal whether it is an obligation of parents that Chazal applied to all mitzvos as a component of each individual mitzvah—in which case the details of each mitzvah are pertinent in educating a child. But if the onus of chinuch is a distinct requirement on parents, separate from the mitzvos and their minutiae, their duty to teach about mitzvos projects in a more general way. (See more on this topic in Halachah #725).
Melachos: The chakirah regarding the melachos (types of work forbidden on Shabbos)—whether they should be defined by the activity itself or by their result—leads to the following halachic question: If a person plants a seed, but immediately removes it from the ground—are they liable for having violated the first melachah of charishah (planting), or is it only a problem if they left it there and something later grew as result of their effort?
Tosefes Shabbos: When a person decides to add time to Shabbos, the question arises whether the added time is a separate entity, or is now considered an actual part of Shabbos. This chakirah would bring to light whether it is permissible during this span of time to fulfill the mitzvos of Shabbos, such as kiddush and the seudah (festive meal).