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Galgal Hachozer: When Halachah Runs in Circles

Scenario #1: A baby boy’s bris milah (circumcision ceremony) must be postponed and is rescheduled for Shabbos.

According to halachah, only a bris that is on time—on the eighth day—is docheh Shabbos (suspends the observance of Shabbos). So a mohel who performs a belated bris on Shabbos is a mechalel Shabbos (one who violates Shabbos), a condition that invalidates the bris. But, we may argue, if the bris is passul (invalidated), no issur d’oraysah (Biblical prohibition) actually occurred, since the surgery of the passul bris becomes a destructive act—so perhaps it is kosher after all?

This type of conundrum is called galgal hachozer (a recurring circle) and there are many different opinions in halachah as how to resolve such situations. One approach to determine whether something is kosher or permissible (or not) is to evoke the rule of sfeika d’oraysa l’chumra/sfeika d’rabbanan l’kula (an issue of Biblical prohibition is resolved stringently and a Rabbinic issue, leniently). Applying this principle to a postponed bris performed on Shabbos (in the category of d’oraysa), would make it passul.

Scenario #2: A meal consists of wine, barley and olives—which brachah comes first?

The halacha of kedimah (priority) dictates that the brachah on wine precedes that on olives, barley precedes wine, and olives precede barley! (see Halachah #613 and Halachah #225 for more on kedimah). A classic galgal hachozer, how do we determine which brachah comes first, if the choices are mutually exclusive?

One suggestion to avoid such a dilemma is to take one of the three items off the table, and make the brachah in the correct sequence for the remaining two.

Scenario #3: A father asks his son for a favor, but the timing is in conflict with an important business meeting. Meanwhile, minutes after he left home to visit his father, the son’s neighbor calls, “I left the house in a rush this morning. Can you please lock my front door?”

There is a halachic opinion that a person is bound to place his father’s honor above his own interests, even if it will be at a personal loss. But he is enjoined to protect another’s property before honoring his father. Yet he is not required to put someone else’s potential loss before his own. How to resolve this Catch-22?

Some poskim maintain that in such an intractable galgal hachozer, where performing a mitzvah directly conflicts with performing another, a person is exempt from both mitzvos.